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| | '''Philosophy of science''' is the part of [[philosophy]] that studies the [[sciences]]. | | '''Philosophy of science''' is the part of [[philosophy]] that studies the [[sciences]]. |
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| − | [[Philosopher]]s who are interested in science study how knowledge is built up by scientists, and what makes science different from other activities. No doubt, modern science has advanced knowledge in a wide range of fields. How has it done this? To tackle this issue, a number of other issues have to be tackled also. | + | [[Philosopher]]s who are interested in science study how knowledge is built up by scientists, and what makes science different from other activities. No doubt, modern science has advanced knowledge in a wide range of fields. How has it done this? To tackle this issue, a number of other issues also have to be tackled. |
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| | == What makes science distinct? == | | == What makes science distinct? == |
| − | In earlier times, some have thought science was nothing but organised [[common sense]]. [[Thomas Henry Huxley]] thought this. However, as the twentieth century went on, science produced many ideas which were nothing like common sense. Then it was clear that science really was something different from commonsense knowledge. But what was it? This is called the demarcation problem.
| + | Some people think that in earlier times, science was nothing but organized [[common sense]]. [[Thomas Henry Huxley]] thought this. However, during the twentieth century, science produced many ideas which were nothing like common sense, like [[general relativity]]. Then it was clear that science really was something different from common sense. But what was it? This is called the demarcation problem. |
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| − | The demarcation problem refers to the distinction between science and non-science (including [[pseudoscience]]). [[Karl Popper]] called this the central question in the philosophy of science.<ref name="Thornton2006">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/|title = Karl Popper|accessdate = 2007-12-01|last = Thornton|first = Stephen|year = 006|work = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> No account of the problem has got full agreement among philosophers; some regard the problem as insoluble or uninteresting.<ref name="Laudan1983">{{cite book | last = Laudan | first = Larry | editor = Adolf Grünbaum, Robert Sonné Cohen, Larry Laudan | title = Physics, philosophy, and psychoanalysis: essays in honor of Adolf Grünbaum | year = 1983 | publisher = Springer | isbn = 90-277-1533-5 | chapter = The demise of the demarcation problem}}</ref> | + | The demarcation problem refers to the distinction between science and non-science (like [[pseudoscience]]). [[Karl Popper]] called this the central question in the philosophy of science.<ref name="Thornton2006">{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/|title=Karl Popper|accessdate=2007-12-01|last=Thornton|first=Stephen|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|date=Nov 13, 1997}}</ref> No solution to the problem has had full agreement among philosophers; some of them think the problem is insoluble or uninteresting.<ref name="Laudan1983">{{cite book|title=Physics, philosophy, and psychoanalysis: essays in honor of Adolf Grünbaum|last=Laudan|first=Larry|publisher=Springer|year=1983|isbn=90-277-1533-5|editor=Adolf Grünbaum|chapter=The demise of the demarcation problem|editor-last2=Robert Sonné Cohen|editor-last3=Larry Laudan}}</ref> |
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| − | The [[logical positivists]] tried to base science on observation. In their view, truth was achieved by [[verification]]. Non-science was non-observational and meaningless.<ref name="Uebel2006">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/|title = Vienna Circle|accessdate = 2007-12-01|last = Uebel|first = Thomas|year = 2006|work = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> | + | The [[logical positivists]] tried to base science on observation. In their view, truth was achieved by logic and observation. Non-science was non-observational and meaningless.<ref name="Uebel2006">{{cite encyclopedia|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/|title = Vienna Circle|accessdate = 2007-12-01|last = Uebel|first = Thomas|year = 2006|encyclopedia = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> |
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| − | Against that, Popper argued that the central property of science is [[falsifiability]]. All scientific claims can be proved false, at least in principle. If no such proof can be found despite sufficient effort, then the claim is likely true.<ref name="Popper1959">{{cite book | last = Popper | first = Karl | authorlink = Karl Popper | title = The logic of scientific discovery | year = 2004 | publisher = Routledge Classics | location = London & New York | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Yq6xeupNStMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+logic+of+scientific+discovery&hl=en&sa=X&ei=j_eYT4D6I8L1mAX05pGJBg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA | isbn=0-415-27844-9 | postscript= First published 1959 by Hutchinson & Co.}}</ref> Popper's ideas were applauded by many scientists (like [[Peter Medawar]]). However, sceptics noticed that theories were often not discarded when a prediction was refuted. The theory was simply adjusted to take into account the new findings. It was clear from this that, although falsifiability was important, it could not be a simple way to distinguish science from non-science. | + | Against that, Popper argued that the central property of science is [[falsifiability]]. All scientific claims can be proved false, at least in principle. If no such proof can be found despite sufficient effort, then the claim is likely true.<ref name="Popper1959">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Yq6xeupNStMC&q=the+logic+of+scientific+discovery|title=The logic of scientific discovery|last=Popper|first=Karl|publisher=Routledge Classics|year=2004|isbn=0-415-27844-9|location=London & New York|authorlink=Karl Popper|orig-year=First published 1959 by Hutchinson & Co.}}</ref> Popper's ideas were applauded by many scientists (like [[Peter Medawar]]). However, skeptics noticed that ideas were often not discarded when a prediction was refuted. The ideas were simply adjusted to take into account the new findings. It was clear from this that, although falsifiability was important, it could not be a simple way to distinguish science from non-science. |
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| − | Other approaches were tried. One idea that science was a problem-solving process aimed at finding answers to questions.<ref>Bunge, Mario 1967. ''Scientific research''. Volume 1: ''The search for system''; volume 2: ''The search for truth''. Springer-Verlag, Berlin & New York. Reprinted as ''Philosophy of science'', Transaction, 1998.</ref> Of course, many other fields try to answer questions and solve problems. Another approach was to define science as the search for objective truth. But [[objectivity (science)|objectivity]] is very difficult to define, and whether science really is objective is open to question. | + | Other approaches were tried. One idea that science was a problem-solving process aimed at finding answers to questions.<ref>Bunge, Mario 1967. ''Scientific research''. Volume 1: ''The search for system''; volume 2: ''The search for truth''. Springer-Verlag, Berlin & New York. Reprinted as ''Philosophy of science'', Transaction, 1998.</ref> Of course, many other fields try to answer questions and solve problems. Another approach was to define science as the search for objective truth. But [[objectivity (science)|objectivity]] is very hard to define, and whether science really is objective is open to question. |
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| − | With biology, the situation was rather different. There were many thousands of published observations, and what was achieved by [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] was to show that sense could be made of the observations if it were the case that [[evolution]] had taken place. In a [[natural history]] science (such as [[biology]], [[geology]] or [[astronomy]]), one of the main jobs of science is to explain what has happened and what is seen. Obviously, [[wikt:explanation|explanations]] as well as observations and theories are part of the philosophy of science. | + | With biology, the situation wasn't the same as other parts of science. There were thousands of published observations, and [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] showed that sense could be made of the observations. He used those ideas to prove [[evolution]] had taken place. In a [[natural history]] science (such as [[biology]], [[geology]] or [[astronomy]]), one of the main jobs of science is to explain what has happened and what is seen. Obviously, [[explanation|explanations]] as well as observations and theories are part of the philosophy of science. |
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| | == Theories and observations == | | == Theories and observations == |
| − | Both theory and observations are part of science, and they are tied together in a kind of cycle. A very clear example was the prediction of [[Einstein]] that a source of [[gravity]] (such as a star) would bend light passing nearby. An expedition was organised in 1919 to record the positions of stars around the Sun during a solar [[eclipse]]. The observation of star positions showed that the apparent star positions close to the Sun were changed slightly from their normal expected positions. In effect, the light passing the Sun was pulled towards the sun by gravitation. This confirmed predictions of gravitational lensing made by Albert Einstein in the [[general theory of relativity]], published in 1915. This was the first solid evidence in favour of Einstein's theory. | + | Both theory and observations are part of science, and they are tied together in a kind of cycle. A clear example was the prediction of [[Einstein]] that a source of [[gravity]] (such as a star) would bend light passing nearby. An expedition was organised in 1919 to record the positions of stars around the Sun during a solar [[eclipse]]. It showed that the positions of the stars close to the Sun were changed slightly from their normal expected positions. The light passing close to the Sun was pulled towards the sun by gravitation. This seemed to prove Einstein's [[general theory of relativity]], published in 1915. Many years later, the proof was shown to be wrong.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gilmore FRS|first1=Gerard|last2=Tausch-Pebody|first2=Gudrun|title=The 1919 eclipse results that verified general relativity and their later detractors: a story re-told|url=https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsnr.2020.0040|journal=Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science|year=2022|volume=76|pages=155–180|doi=10.1098/rsnr.2020.0040|s2cid=225075861}}</ref> But by then other observations (of [[time dilation]]) showed that Einstein actually was right. [[Gravitational lensing]] proved that light was pulled towards the Sun. |
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| | The point here is that the observation and the theory were connected. The observation would not have been made but for the theory, and then the observation was convincing evidence in favour of the theory. The theory had passed a [[critical test]]. Since then, many more tests have been made of Einstein's ideas, and all have been consistent with his theory. | | The point here is that the observation and the theory were connected. The observation would not have been made but for the theory, and then the observation was convincing evidence in favour of the theory. The theory had passed a [[critical test]]. Since then, many more tests have been made of Einstein's ideas, and all have been consistent with his theory. |
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| | *[[Positivism]] | | *[[Positivism]] |
| | *[[Logical positivism]] | | *[[Logical positivism]] |
| | + | *[[Metaphilosophy]] |
| | *[[Philosophy of mathematics]] | | *[[Philosophy of mathematics]] |
| | *[[Philosophy of language]] | | *[[Philosophy of language]] |
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| | * [http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43784 An introduction to the Philosophy of Science, aimed at beginners - Paul Newall.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120220084001/http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43784 |date=2012-02-20 }} | | * [http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43784 An introduction to the Philosophy of Science, aimed at beginners - Paul Newall.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120220084001/http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43784 |date=2012-02-20 }} |
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| − | [[Category:Philosophy]] | + | {{Philosophy topics}} |
| | + | [[Category:Philosophy of science]] |
| | [[Category:Science]] | | [[Category:Science]] |